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Abstract: In this paper a public bureau can extract surplus value from the services 
it provides not only by misrepresenting its production costs to its oversight 
committee but also by influencing the perceptions of the legislative body such as 
the parliament or the congress and the public at large by costly argumentation. By 
juxtaposing the bureau’s ability to ‘influence’ with its ability to misreport or ‘lie’, I 
examine the impact influencing might have on the bureau’s incentives to lie and on 
the efficiency of bureaucratic provision. I find that a truth-telling equilibrium could 
exist where the bureau’s ability to influence would deter it from lying and the level 
of bureaucratic provision would be efficient. However, there could also be an 
equilibrium where the bureau would lie in which case there would be either over-
production or under-production. This suggests that even when the bureau only 
cares about extracting the surplus value of its production, there could still be over-
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“In Washington, you can be successful if you appear to be successful…appearances 




The allocation of budgets to government agencies typically involves 
suspicion and cynicism amongst politicians, academicians and people at large. The 
budgets of such agencies are often controversial with doubts lingering over whether 
the assigned budgets are sufficient or whether the bureaus are actually capable of 
delivering the benefits for which the funds are assigned. Further, since many 
bureaus exclusively provide the service they are assigned, there is no natural way of 
learning about the true minimum cost of operations, as would be the case in a 
decentralized competitive market setup.
2 Hence it is hardly surprising that concerns 
about the efficacy of the budgeting process have generated a sizable literature in 
this area.  
Early contributions such as Niskanen (1975) and Migue and Belanger 
(1974) hypothesized that the monopoly nature of supply and the superior 
information on production cost would give public bureaus an enormous advantage 
over their political bosses in the budget appropriations process. Hence they focused 
on characterizing the bureau’s objective function to predict its impact on the nature 
                                                                   
1 See Wilson (1989), pg. 197. 
2 See Carroll (1989) for a contrary perspective on the monopolistic set up of government agencies.    
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of budget allocation. Niskanen (1975) argued that the bureaus were obsessed 
towards expanding their size and as a result public bureaucracies would be 
characterized by excessive budgets and oversupply of output. However, Migue and 
Belanger (1974) argued that instead of maximizing the absolute size of the budget, 
the bureau would be primarily concerned with maximizing its discretionary budget 
(the excess of its budget over the minimum cost of production), to fund its 
preferred expenditures.  
  Subsequent research focused more on the strategic relationship between the 
bureau and its oversight committee while adopting a “middle path” in modeling the 
bureau’s objective function: some weight was put on both the discretionary budget 
and the level of output produced. Breton and Wintrobe (1975) asserted that 
Niskanen’s model had attributed excessive bargaining power to the bureau. They 
argued that the congressional oversight committees have access to control devices 
to monitor, ascertain information about and reproach erring bureaus. Later research 
along these lines explicitly incorporated the strategic roles of the bureau and 
congressional oversight body into their analysis (Chan and Mestelman (1988), 
Marselian (1998), Miller (1977), Miller and Moe (1983), Moene (1986)), showing 
that the nature of production inefficiency in bureaucratic provision would be 
sensitive to the structure of the game between the two, and even under-production 
could not be ruled out despite a bureaucratic preference for output. This further led 
to an examination of the usefulness of specific auditing procedures that might be 
available to the congressional bodies to significantly limit the information 
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advantage of the bureaus (For example, see Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen (1985, 
1987), Banks (1989), Banks and Weingast (1992)). 
  However, while examining the nature of bureaucratic preferences and 
delving deeply into the effectiveness of various instruments available to the 
congressional committees for controlling the bureaus, the existing literature has 
overlooked another conspicuous feature of the budgeting process: the game of 
arguments and counter-arguments between the bureau executives and their 
oversight-committees played out in front of a larger audience comprising the much 
less informed: the floor of the parliament or the Congress and through the various 
media channels, the public at large. Even when the budgetary oversight committee 
and the bureau have exactly the same understanding about the true costs of 
provision, it might not be verifiable to a larger body of congressmen and important 
public personalities (hereafter referred to as “public”) whose opinions can be 
manipulated by carefully crafted arguments and whose support might be important 
in shaping the outcome of the budgetary process.  
Hence the contest of arguments and persuasive appeals between the bureau 
and its oversight committee can affect the size of the budget the former can wrestle 
from the latter (hereafter called the ‘committee’). I call this aspect of the budgetary 
process ‘influencing’.   In the ensuing analysis, I juxtapose the bureau’s ability to 
influence the public with its ability to mislead or lie to the committee regarding the 
production cost. I examine the incentives for the bureau to lie given that it has the 
ability to extract surplus budget through influence. It turns out that lying might not    
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be inevitable. The bureau might prefer to report accurate costs to the committee and 
fight with it in the public arena. In such situations, the committee decides on the 
output with accurate cost information and the production decisions are efficient. 
However, although ‘truth-telling’ is feasible, it is not guaranteed. Lying might 
occur, in which case production decisions are made on inaccurate information and 
hence inefficient. The inefficiency may go either ways. Neither over-production nor 
under-production can be ruled out. However, since the specified objective function 
of the bureau (to be defined precisely in the next section) does not necessarily 
imply a special preference for output, in contrast to the existing literature, in my 
model over-production may result purely due to asymmetric information rather 
than any bureaucratic preference for output. In the next section, I describe the 
model and the timing of events. The subsequent sections discuss the plausibility of 
the different equilibria. 
2. The model 
The model consists of two active agents: a budgetary committee and the 
bureau. While the bureau tries to ‘pocket’ the surplus value of production to fund 
its preferred expenses, the committee tries to decide on a level of output and budget 
that maximizes the net benefit the public might derive from the bureau’s services. 
In doing so, the committee must evaluate the bureau’s reported cost estimates; 
decide on the level of output and budget and present arguments before the public to 
defend its budget in the face of the bureau’s assertions. The bureau might want to 
deceive the committee by inflating cost estimates and argue for a higher budget    
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over the committee’s recommendation by persuasive appeals to the public. Both are 
assumed to be risk-neutral. 
An important assumption through out the analysis is the difficulty faced by 
the committee in conveying information about production costs accurately and 
credibly to the less informed public. Hence despite the fact that it acts in public 
interest, the public opinion might still be manipulated by clever argumentation 
from the bureau generating political pressure to raise budgets over the committee’s 
recommendation. However, arguments are not ‘cheap’ and impose costs on both 
the bureau and the committee.
3 
 I now proceed to describe the information structure and the time line of the 
model more precisely.
4 Let  ) (Q B denote the total benefits derived by the public 
from the output (Q) produced by the bureau.
5 For the purposes of simplicity and 
analytical clarity, I assume that both the committee and the bureau have perfect 
information about the benefits function. The bureau on the other hand has private 
information regarding the true cost of provision. The exact nature of this 
information asymmetry is as follows: For simplicity, let the cost function 
be Q c Q C * = ) (  where c represents the per-unit cost of provision. The true value of 
c is either  l h c or c (where  l h c c > ).  Nature picks up the true level of c (either 
                                                                   
3 These costs would typically involve both money and time: resources spent on 
collecting/fabricating evidence to buttress the case and time spent to organize the evidence and 
prepare a persuasive presentation. 
4 See figure 1 for a diagrammatic representation of the game. 
5 To ensure concavity of the payoff functions I assume that  0 ) ( > ¢ Q B  and  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ Q B .    
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l h c or c ) at the beginning of the game. It chooses h c with the probability of h p . 
Accordingly, it chooses  l c with a probability of  h p - 1 .  
Only the bureau observes the nature’s pick and decides what to report to the 
committee. On account of prior investigation, the committee knows the structure of 
the cost function and the prior probabilities of  l h c or c . However it does not 
observe the nature’s pick and must evaluate the veracity of the bureau’s report 
while making its cost-estimates. Having made its cost-estimates, the committee 
decides on the level of output (Q), the least cost budget to finance the output and its 
argument-related expenses  ( ) s m  to back its budget recommendations. At this stage, 
the bureau also simultaneously determines its argument-related expenses ( ) b m  to 
support its requests for budget raises.  
Hence the bureau’s strategy has two components. It must decide what to 
report and the level of its argument-related expenditures ( ) b m  after observing 
either of the two possible cost levels picked by nature. The reporting component of 
its strategy comprises of a mapping from the set C = { l h c c , } onto itself. Let me 
denote this mapping by  ( ) C Ri  where  L or T i= depending on whether it decides to 
report the costs truly or lie about them. Within this framework, a truthful report 
would entail transmitting the nature’s pick accurately to the committee. The 
strategy to lie would amount to reporting either  l h c or c  irrespective of what is 
observed by it. Similarly,  ) (C Mb  associates a level of argument-related    
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expenditure  ( ) b m  for each of the two levels of c. Hence its strategy can be 
described as [ ( ) C Ri ,  ) (C Mb ] where  b m [ ) ¥ ˛ , 0 .  
Similarly, the committee’s strategy also has two components.
6 It must 
decide on the level of output (Q) and the argument-related expenditures ( s m ) (to 
counter the bureau’s influence) after receiving each of the two possible bureau 
reports. Hence it associates for each level of c the pair [Q,  s m ] where 
[ ) ¥ ˛ , 0 , s m Q . I denote the committee’s strategy as S(C).  ) (C Mb and S(C) are 
determined simultaneously. In determining S(C), the committee’s belief about the 
true per-unit cost of production becomes important. The committee’s belief is its 
posterior probability of the true cost being  h c , which is derived by updating its 
prior probability of  h c  on the basis of bureau’s reported cost-level using Baye’s 
Rule. Let it be denoted by  ) (C h m .  
Let  ] )} ( 1 { ) ( [ ~
l h h h c c c c c * ¢ - + * ¢ = m m  denote the committee’s expected per 
unit cost of production given the bureau’s reported cost-level  } , { l h c c c ˛ ¢ . 
Accordingly, following the bureau’s report, the committee perceives the net 
consumer’s surplus to be  Q c Q B ~ ) ( - . Since the committee is guided by public 
interest, for any level of output Q, it would prefer to assign a budget of  Q c ~  so as to 
provide the maximum net benefit to the public. However, since the bureau can 
manipulate the public’s perceptions about cost to extract a budget above  Q c ~ , it    
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must spend resources to counter bureau’s arguments.  Relative strengths of their 
arguments determine how much of the surplus is appropriated by the bureau 
through influencing. In particular, given that bureau spends  b m while the 
committee spends  s m towards producing the arguments, I posit that the bureau 


















- 1  is the fraction of the surplus that the committee retains for 
the public. Hence the more resources spent by the bureau relative to the committee, 
the greater is its share. Such ratio functions, more generally termed as Contest 
Success Functions (CSF) have been used in the public choice literature to model 
outcomes in rent-seeking contests (e.g. Tullock (1980)).7 A more relevant context 
to the one described above where such functions have been used is to model win-
probabilities of the plaintiffs and defendants in litigation battles (e.g. Hirshleifer 
and Osborne (2001)). Following Marselian (1998),
8 I use this particularly simple 
and symmetric form of the CSF for analytical ease.  









] ~ ) ( [           (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 After having made the cost estimates and decided on output, the committee’s choice of budget is 
automatic: the least cost of producing the chosen level of output. This follows from the assumption 
that the committee acts in the public interest. 
7 For a detailed discussion of the axiomatic properties of such functions see Skaperdas (1996).    
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b ) ~ ( ] ~ ) ( [ - + - -
+
         (2) 
where 
T c is the true per-unit cost of production as picked by nature.  
The committee’s payoff is the share of the surplus it manages to retain for the 
public less the costs of competing with the bureau in doing so. The bureau’s payoff 
has two components.  Q c c T ) ~ ( -  is the amount of surplus budget that the bureau is 
able to extract by misreporting or lying about production cost to the committee. 
The remaining component  b
s b





] ~ ) ( [ represents the net gain to the 
to the bureau from influencing. Given the committee’s proposed budget  Q c ~ , the 
bureau argues for more to the public. To the extent that it is successful, it extracts 
additional surplus value.
9  In the following sections, I examine how the bureau’s 
ability to extract surplus this way through influencing interacts with its incentive to 
lie to the committee regarding production costs and its implication for production 
efficiency.  
3.  Is truth-telling feasible?
10 
In this section, I begin by examining the possibility of a Perfect Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium (PBE) of the above game, which involves truthful reporting by 
the bureau. In other words I characterize and check the feasibility of {([ ( ) C RT , 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 In Marselian (1998), the target of bureau’s persuasion is the committee itself. However, in my 
analysis, the target is the public – relatively much less informed than the committee. 
9 I make the reasonable assumption that the public would not support a budget raise that would 
make the surplus negative.  
10 Details of derivations can be made available upon request.    
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) ( * C M b ], ) ( * C S ), ) (C h m }(where  1 ) ( = h h c m and  0 ) ( = l h c m ) emerging as a 
PBE.  
When the bureau resorts to truth-telling ( ( ) C RT ), it reveals  h c  upon 
observing   h c and  l c  upon observing  l c . Along the PBE, the committee perceives 
the veracity of the bureau’s reports and hence infers the reported cost information 
as correct while making its decisions about Q and  s m . Suppose that the true per 
unit cost of production happens to be  h c . Then under the above assumptions, from 
(1) and (2), the bureau and the committee’s optimal simultaneous choices of  b m  
and  ) , ( Q ms  respectively are determined as follows: 
Committee: ] ) ) ( ( [ max , s h
s b
s





      (3) 
Bureau:  ] ) ) ( ( [ max b h
s b
b





        (4) 
Solving the above maximization problems simultaneously yields the following 




b h m m Q , , ): 
h h c Q B = ¢ ) (                   (5) 







b Q c Q B m m m - = = =            (6) 
It is clear from (5) that the level of output  h Q  is efficient as it is determined at the 
point where marginal benefit equals the true marginal cost of production. Further 
by substituting (6) into the objective functions of the committee and the bureau it    
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follows that they share the surplus equally, and accordingly, their net payoffs are 
equal to  ) ) ( (
4
1
h h h Q c Q B - . Since the bureau reports the cost truthfully, it forgoes 
any potential gains from lying. 
Similarly, when the true per unit cost happens to be  l c , the equilibrium values of 
the decision variables ( l
s
l
b l m m Q , , ) obey the following: 
l l c Q B = ¢ ) (                   (7) 







b Q c Q B m m m - = = =             (8) 
Again, the level of output is efficient, being determined by the point where the 
marginal benefit equals true marginal cost of production. Bureau and committee 
share the surplus equally, and accordingly, their net payoffs are equal 
to ) ) ( (
4
1
l l l Q c Q B - . Again, since the bureau reports the cost truthfully, it forgoes 
any potential gains from lying. Hence along a truth-telling equilibrium there is no 
distortion of cost information and the committee manages to choose efficient 
quantities of supply. However, budgets are above the minimum cost of production, 
the magnitude of the excess depending on the relative ability of the bureau to 
misguide the public. 
 I now demonstrate the feasibility of such equilibrium by checking whether 
the bureau prefers to deviate from truth-telling given the strategy and the beliefs of 
the committee. This should be enough to demonstrate the plausibility of such 
equilibrium as by construction, the committee’s strategy is sequentially rational and 
its beliefs are consistent given truth telling by bureau. Suppose the bureau observes     
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l c . Does it make sense for the bureau to lie and report h c  instead, given the 
committee’s strategy and beliefs?  Let us assume that the bureau chooses to lie and 
report  h c . In this case, the committee assuming that the bureau is saying the truth 
infers the true cost to be  h c . Accordingly, its objective function is still given by 
expression (3). However, the bureau’s objective function becomes: 
Bureau:  Q c c m Q c Q B
m m
m
l h b h
s b
b
b m * - + - -
+
) ( ] ) ) ( ( [ max     (9) 
Only difference between (9) and (4) is the presence of a second component, which 
represents the gain from lying. Hence by exactly the same logic as before, the 
bureau’s net payoff from reporting  h c  after observing  l c becomes: 
h l h h h h Q c c Q c Q B ] [ ] ) ( [
4
1 - + -             (10) 
Let’s compare this with the bureau’s payoff from truthful reporting as given by 
) ) ( (
4
1
l l l Q c Q B -                 (11) 
Hence, reporting  l c  truthfully makes sense when (11) exceeds (10) i.e. if: 
0 ) ( }] ) ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 > - - - - - h l h h h h l l l Q c c Q c Q B Q c Q B       (12) 
The first component of the above expression refers to the increase in the 
consumers’ surplus that the bureau can appropriate if it reports  l c truthfully as 
against falsely reporting  h c . Clearly this component is positive as  l h c c > . Hence 
the influence channel makes truthful reporting attractive as it increases the size of 
the ‘pie’ to be appropriated. However, this influence related gain has to be weighed    
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against the chance of directly siphoning off some of the surplus by lying, which is 
measured by the next component in the above expression. Hence when the increase 
in surplus by reporting the low cost truthfully is large enough, bureau may well 
prefer to convey it accurately. 
Now suppose that the bureau observes  h c . Can it gain by lying and 
reporting  l c  instead? Should it choose to report  l c , then by exactly the same 
reasoning as above, its net payoff would be:  
l h l l l l Q c c Q c Q B ] [ ] ) ( [
4
1 - + -             (13) 
Its net payoff by accurately reporting  h c  is 
) ) ( (
4
1
h h h Q c Q B -                 (14) 
 Hence, reporting  h c  truthfully would be optimal if (14) exceeds (13) i.e. if: 
0 ) ( }] ) ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 > - - - - - l h l l l l h h h Q c c Q c Q B Q c Q B       (15) 
However, notice that given the assumption that the marginal benefit is diminishing, 
it never pays the bureau to report  l c  when the true cost happens to be  h c so long as 
the committee upon receiving the signal  l c  puts any positive probability on the 
likelihood of the true cost being  l c  (so that the inferred per-unit cost 
] )} ( 1 { ) ( [ ~
l h h c c c c c * ¢ - + * ¢ = m m  is strictly less than  h c ). Figure 2 demonstrates 
this point. Essentially the additional perceived surplus created by the bureau (the 
area ADC or the expression  ] ( [ ] ) ( [ h h h l l l Q c Q B Q c Q B - - -  in (15)) from under-
reporting (to be partially appropriated through the influence channel) is always less    
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than the direct loss suffered by the bureau (the area ABDC or the expression 
l l h Q c c ) ( -  in (15)) in the form of a smaller operating budget due to deliberate 
under-reporting of the true per-unit cost to the committee. Hence one would expect 
(15) to be always satisfied. Hence truth-telling PBE is possible when (12) holds.  
This result is summarized in the proposition below: 
 
Proposition 1: When  0 ) ( }] ) ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 > - - - - - h l h h h h l l l Q c c Q c Q B Q c Q B , the 
bureau reports the costs truthfully ensuring an efficient level of output despite 
surplus budgets.  
 
When the bureau can extract the surplus value of production by influencing 
the public’s perceptions, it would internalize some of the distortion-induced loss in 
surplus value caused by its misrepresentation of production costs. Hence lying need 
not be inevitable and truth-telling might emerge to ensure efficient provision of 
bureaucratic output. However, the influence channel would imply excess budgets. 
Condition (12), however, also suggests that truth-telling is not inevitable. In the 
next section I proceed to characterize the nature of lying equilibrium. 
4.  Examining the lying equilibrium 
Given, that it never pays the bureau to report  l c  when the true per-unit cost 
is  h c , the only lying equilibrium that one needs to look for is the one where the 
bureau reports  h c  irrespective of what it observes. I denote such reporting as    
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( ) C RL . Hence I check the feasibility of {([ ( ) C RL ,  ) ( * C M b ], ) ( * C S ), ) (C h m } 
(where  h h h p c = ) ( m ; 0 ) ( = l h c m ) emerging as a PBE of the above game.
11 
 Suppose the true per-unit cost happens to be  h c . Accordingly the bureau 
reports it as  h c . Given committee’s belief, its inferred per unit cost of production is 
c c p c p c l h h h ˆ ] * ) 1 ( [ ~ = - + * =             (16) 
As a result, its perceived consumers’ surplus for any given (Q) is  Q c Q B ˆ ) ( - . 









] ˆ ) ( [ max ,         (17) 
Similarly, the bureau’s choice of  b m  taking  Q ms,  as given is governed by: 
Bureau:  b h
s b
b
b m m Q c c Q c Q B
m m
m
- * - + -
+
) ˆ ( ] ˆ ) ( [ max       (18) 
Accordingly, the equilibrium magnitudes ( s b m m Q ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ) satisfy the following: 
0 ˆ ) ˆ ( = - ¢ c Q B                  (19) 
] ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( [ ˆ ˆ ˆ
4
1 Q c Q B m m m s b - = = =             (20) 
                                                                   
11 The equilibrium beliefs need some explanation. Since the bureau reports  h c  irrespective of what 
it observes, such a report would be uninformative to the committee. Hence, its posterior belief upon 
getting the report of  h c  is the same as it’s prior belief: i.e.  h h h p c = ) ( m .  However strictly 
speaking, the sending of signal  l c  is off the equilibrium path of the game. Hence a PBE does not 
impose any restrictions on  ) ( l h c m  given the bureau’s reporting behavior. However since (as 
argued in the previous section) it never pays the bureau to report  l c when the true per-unit cost is 
h c , it is reasonable to say that the committee would place a zero probability on this signal coming 
from a high-cost bureau. Hence by invoking the Intuitive Criterion (see Gibbons (1992), pg. 239), I 
set  0 ) ( = l h c m .    
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Hence the bureau’s net payoff is given by 
  Q c c Q c Q B h ˆ ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( [
4
1 - + -               (21) 
 Since the committee ignores the bureau’s report, it under-estimates the true 
production cost and hence chooses to produce a larger than optimal level of output 
as given by (19). There is over-production. 
When the true per unit cost happens to be l c , the bureau signals  h c  and by 
exactly the same reasoning as above, its net payoff is given by: 
   Q c c Q c Q B l ˆ ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( [
4
1 - + -               (22) 
In this case the committee over-estimates the production cost, and hence there is 
under-provision. 
   I now examine the feasibility of the lying equilibrium. From the previous 
section, it is clear that if the true per-unit cost happens to be  h c , the bureau would 
never benefit by reporting  l c  instead of  h c . Hence this deviation will clearly not be 
profitable. Now suppose that the true per-unit cost happens to be  l c . If the bureau 
were to report it truthfully, then as argued above, the committee’s inferred per unit 
cost would be  l c  and hence bureau’s net payoff would be: 
  ) ) ( (
4
1
l l l Q c Q B -                 (23) 
 Hence lying could emerge as equilibrium if (22) exceeded (23) that is, if: 
Q c c p Q c Q B Q c Q B l h h l l l ˆ ) ( }] ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 - < - - -         (24) 
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The bureau gains from misrepresenting  l c  through the capture of a part of the 
consumers’ surplus as given by the expression on the right hand side of the above 
inequality (Note that  Q c c p Q c c l h h l ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ˆ ( - = - ). However, this gain comes at a 
price. The perceived surplus and, hence, the share extracted through influence 
would be smaller in this case than under truthful reporting. When the direct benefit 
exceeds this loss in the share extracted through influence, the temptation to lie 
would be overwhelming. That is to say, the committee would not believe the 
bureau when it reports  h c  and we would have the lying equilibrium.  
In the lying equilibrium, production distortions are inevitable: there will be 
either over-production or under-production depending on the actual level of the true 
per-unit cost of production. However, notice that in this framework, over-
production is not due a bureaucratic preference for output: all that the bureau cares 
about is appropriating the surplus value of production. Over-production results 
simply because the committee does not have recourse to accurate information 
regarding the true marginal cost of production. Hence it is not necessary to 
explicitly incorporate a bureaucratic preference for output if one is worried about 
the possibility of over-production in bureaucracies. This result is summarized in the 
proposition below: 
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Proposition 2: When  Q c c p Q c Q B Q c Q B l h h l l l ˆ ) ( }] ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 - < - - - , the 
bureau has an incentive to misreport  l c , which induces a lying equilibrium. The 
provision of output is sub-optimal. If the true cost happens to be  l c , there is  under-
production. If the true cost happens to be  h c , there is over-production.  
 
However, notice that over-production is not due to any bureaucratic preference for 
output. Rather it is simply due to the fact that bureau’s report lacks credibility and 
hence the committee has to act in accordance to its coarse prior information.  
Given that both truth-telling and lying equilibrium are feasible, under which set 
of parameter values is one more likely than the other? To explore this question, I 
look at a numerical example in the next section. 
1.5  A numerical example 
In this section, I explore the set of parameter values for which one kind of 
equilibrium is more likely than the other. To do this, I assume the following: 
5 . 0 ) ( AQ Q B = ,  0 > A               (25) 
2
1 = h p                    (26) 
Given the above assumptions, I identify the set of values for  h c  and  l c  for which 
the truth-telling equilibrium is possible. Along a truth-telling equilibrium when the 
true cost happens to be  h c , 
  h h h c Q B Q = ¢ ) ( :     
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Q =                    (27) 









=                 (28) 
Similarly when the true cost happens to be  l c , 
l l l c Q B Q = ¢ ) ( :  







Q =                   (29) 








=                   (30) 
Using (27), (28), (29), and (30), the following holds: 
h
h h h c
A




= -                (31) 
l
l l l c
A




= -                 (32) 
Next, I substitute equations (27), (31) and (32) into (12), which is the condition for 
truth-telling equilibrium to be feasible to find the relevant parameter values for  h c  
and  l c .    
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Condition (12) is reproduced below for convenience: 
0 ) ( }] ) ( { } ) ( [{
4
1 > - - - - - h l h h h h l l l Q c c Q c Q B Q c Q B  
From (31) and (32), 
l h
l h
h h h l l l c c
c c A
Q c Q B Q c Q B
16
) (


















= -  






                  (33) 
Next, I identify the set of values for  h c  and  l c  for which the lying equilibrium is 
possible. Along the lying equilibrium, the imputed per-unit cost as given by (16) is 
c c p c p c l h h h ˆ ] * ) 1 ( ~ = - + * =  
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The condition for the feasibility of the lying equilibrium as given by (24) stipulates 
that 
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Conditions (33) and (39) have some interesting implications.  Figure 3 
provides a graphical comparison of these conditions. When  h c  and  l c  are very 
close, truth-telling is not a likely outcome. While the gain to the bureau through an 
increase in the surplus due to truthful reporting of  l c  would be small (essentially of 
a second order), lying would bring a larger (first order) gain. Further when 
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both kinds of equilibrium are feasible. When  h c  exceeds  l c  considerably, so that 
(39) does not hold, only truth-telling would be observed in equilibrium. Lying 
would reduce the surplus at stake considerably through the influence channel. This 
suggests that truth-telling is much more likely, precisely when the differences 
between the two possible cost levels are considerable. Hence it would seem that the 
distortions induced by the lying equilibrium are likely when they tend to be less 
harmful.  It is also instructive to note that the bureau’s expected payoff under truth-
telling always exceeds that under lying for any given  1 0 , < < h h p p .12 Hence the 
bureau may have ex-ante incentives to inculcate the committee’s trust in its 
reported cost estimates. This could be one reason why a bureau chief’s ability to 
build a good understanding with the committee could be important in the bureau’s 
prosperity. 
1.6  Conclusions 
My analysis suggests that when the bureau has access to public platforms 
such as the media to influence the perceptions of the bigger less informed audience 
such as the public whose support is also important in the passing of budgets, it 
might prefer to use only that channel to appropriate the surplus value of production, 
and not attempt at misleading the relatively more informed committee or the over-
sight committee by exploiting ’ superior information on production costs. Hence, 
the existing literature might have overlooked the importance of public perceptions 
in the budgetary process by mainly focusing only on asymmetric cost information 
                                                                   
12 Proof available upon request.    
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between the bureau and the committee towards budget determination. James 
Wilson (1989) has noted the importance of public perceptions and constituency 
building in careers of bureau chiefs and their bureaus. In particular he notes,13 “The 
real work of a government executive is to curry favor and placate critics.” Further 
the possibility that the expected payoff under truth-telling could be higher than that 
under lying might suggest why confidence-building measures might be important 
in the agenda of both the bureau and the committee. 
Another important implication of the analysis is that when the problem of 
asymmetric cost information is important as along the lying equilibrium, it might 
be enough to generate a production distortion of either type (i.e. over-production or 
under-production). Hence it might be unnecessary to postulate a taste for output in 
the bureau’s objective function if one is concerned about the possibilities of over-
production. In the above framework, the bureau’s objective function does not 
embody any special preference for output: Left on its own, the bureau would be 
perfectly happy to produce the efficient quantity of output in either case and 
appropriate the entire consumers’ surplus. Hence over-production in this 
framework is entirely due to decisions made on coarse information by the 
committee. It is also interesting to note that the analysis seems to suggest that 
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Figure 1: The game between the bureau and the sponsor 
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Figure 3: Illustrating the zones of truth and lies 
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